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PATIENTS BEWARE: PREEMPTION OF
COMMON LAW CLAIMS UNDER THE
MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS
MICHAEL P. DINATALE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"According to the Rand Corporation, the current cost to the United States from
injuries on the job,
negligent health care, and defective products total $176
1
billion each year."

Products are useful creations but can cause suffering as well. Medical
devices are designed to protect and lengthen the lives of humans, but those
same devices can quickly end a life if the product fails to work properly.
In order to foster the creation of safe medical devices, Congress, in
1976, passed the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug,

and Cosmetic Act of 19382 with two purposes in mind. First, it was intended
to protect public health by promoting safe and effective medical devices.3
The second aim of the MDA was to create a uniform regulatory scheme,
which would encourage innovation in the field and prevent overregulation.
These aims counterbalance each other, with safety of consumers on one side
and the interests of industry on the other. 5 Congress passed the MDA in
. Juris Doctor Candidate May 2006, The John Marshall Law School. The author
would like to thank his family and loved ones for their unending support and patience
throughout the past three years. He would also like to dedicate this article to the memory
of his editor, Patricia Gerdes.
1. ROGELIO LASSO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: AN AMERICAN AND
COMPARATIVE APPROACH, 9-10 (2003).
2. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).

3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), 360c(a)(1)(B), 360e(d)(2) (1976). Theresa J.Pulley
Radwan, Meeting the Objectives of the MDA: Implied Preemption of State Tort Claims by
the Medical Device Amendments, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 343, 349-50(1995/96).
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360j(g)(1), 360k(a) (1976). In 1999, a bill was proposed in both
houses of Congress that would have limited the ability of Congress and government
agencies to preempt state and local laws. Federalism Accountability Act of 1999, S.1214,
106th Cong. (1999). Big business opposed the legislation and the bill was dropped. Cindy
Skrzycki, The ChamberReached a Sticking Point, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1999, at El.
5. See Pulley Radwan, supra note 3, at 349-50. Radwan quoted the House of
Representatives:
Those involved in the development, promotion, and application of medical devices
generally agree that the public deserves more protection against unsafe, unproven,
ineffective, and experimental medical devices. But this belief is counterbalanced
by an equally strong conviction that excessive or ill-conceived Federal device
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response to a number of injuries and deaths caused by interuterine birth
control devices.6 When Congress enacted the MDA, the legislation included
an express preemption clause prohibiting states from enacting or enforcing
any requirement that is different from, or in addition to, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) requirements. 7
Despite Congress's efforts, federal courts continue to disagree about
whether the preemption clause prevents injured people from bringing state
tort claims against the manufacturers. A majority of federal courts have8
ruled that FDA certification of a medical device preempts state law claims.
However, other federal courts of appeal have held that state claims are not
preempted. 9
regulation would stifle progress in this field.
HR. REP. No. 94-853 (1976).
Similar arguments were offered by the Senate during debates over the 1990
amendments to the MDA: "[S]imply put, the [MDA] sought to avoid overregulation, [the
elimination of any] unnecessary resource costs to industry and the government, foster
incentives to encourage innovation in a relatively youthful industry and, most importantly,
provide the public reasonable assurances of safe and effective devices." Id. at 349-50
(quoting S. REP. No. 101-513 (1990)).
6. Laura K. Jortberg, Who Should Bear the Burden of ExperimentalMedical Device
Testing: The Preemptive Scope of the Medical Device Amendments under Slater v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 963, 978 (1994). See also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996) (explaining that the Dalkon Shield was an intrauterine
prophylactic device that caused a large number of pregnancies, infections, and some
deaths).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). FDA regulations provide in part:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug
Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby
making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device
different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration
requirements.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2005).
FDA regulations also state that the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty of fitness is
not preempted. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1). State statutes prohibiting the manufacturing of
adulterated or misbranded devices will usually not be preempted.
21 C.F.R. §
808.1 (d)(6)(ii). It should be noted that claims such as express warranty claims will likely
not be preempted nor will claims that the manufacturer did not comply with FDA
requirements. Michael E. Nast, Medical Device Preemption-A Plaintiffs Perspective, 12
WIDENER L.J. 87, 99-100 (2003).
8. See generally Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (ruling that 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a) expressly preempted state common law claims of defective design and
manufacture and failure to warn); Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.
2001) (en banc) (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 360k preempts plaintiffs claim of failure to
warn); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001) (declaring that the FDA's
pre-market approval procedure preempts common law product liability tort claims); Kemp
v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 preempt common law and statutory product liability tort claims);

Mitchell v. Colagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plaintiffs' claims
were preempted).
9. See generally In re: St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 01-1396, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148
(D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004) (refusing to allow FDA approval to preempt state claims of strict
liability for failure to warn); Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir.

20051

Preemption of Common Law Claims Under the MDA

Part II of this Comment will discuss the classification of medical
devices under the MDA, the process manufacturers go through to obtain
FDA approval of a device, and the principles of preemption. Part III will
analyze the case law applying those principles. Lastly, part IV will propose
a possible solution to the problem.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Device Classification

The MDA placed medical devices into one of three categories, 10 which
determines how much scrutiny that device will receive before being
approved for use."' Class I devices are those that are not used to support
human life and do not pose an unreasonable risk of injury. 12 Examples of
Class I devices include: elastic bandages and tongue depressors. Class II
devices are those that cannot be classified as Class I and may pose an
3
unreasonable risk of injury or that could be used to support human life)
Some home pregnancy kits and powered wheelchairs are examples of Class
II devices. Class III devices are the most regulated because they present a
"potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury."' 14 Class III devices are also
meant to be used to support or sustain human life. 15 Pacemakers, intraocular
lenses, and artificial hips fall into the Class III category.
In order to bring a new Class III device into the marketplace, the
manufacturer must undergo an FDA pre-market approval process to "provide
reasonable assurance of [the device's] safety and effectiveness. 16 To further
ensure safety, the FDA can impose regulations on the
manufacturing
17
processes that must be followed when making the devices.

1999)(finding that the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act do not preempt state claims).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 360c.
11. See Pulley Radwan, supra note 3, at 345-46 (offering an excellent description of
the three categories).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). State law claims are generally the only remedy for
those injured by Class I and 1I devices and are not preempted because the FDA has no
control over the design of those devices. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1419
(1993).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(II). Class III devices include heart valves, heart
pumps, and pacemakers.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(C)(ii)(I).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)(1)(C)(i)(B).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (2000). The FDA has authority to enact regulations governing
"the manufacture, pre-production design validation (including a process to assess the
performance of a device but not including an evaluation of the safety or effectiveness of a
device), packing, storage, and installation.
of devices. This authority extends to all
devices regardless of classification. Id.
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The Pre-MarketApproval Process

On average, the pre-market approval process (PMA) requires 1200
hours to conduct.' 8 The process begins with the manufacturer or a
representative of the manufacturer filing an application. The application
contains information ranging from the name of the applicant to the results of
clinical studies.' 9 The information collected includes product specifications,
the intended uses of the device, how the device is manufactured, results for
clinical studies, and a sample of the device.20
After receiving the completed application, the FDA will begin to
review it.2 ' The FDA will either review the application itself or will submit
the information to a panel of experts to evaluate.2 2 The entire PMA process
is dependent on the manufacturers supplying the FDA with testing and safety
information.23
Manufacturers can undertake the PMA process in other ways than the
traditional method. Manufacturers may also submit a modular PMA, a
streamlined PMA, or a Product Development Protocol (PDP). 4 The
modular PMA process allows manufacturers to submit parts of the

18. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477.

In 2002, the average total time of review for PMA

applications was 213 days. In 2003, the time of review increased to 221 days. OFFICE OF
DEVICE EVALUATION AND OFFICE OF IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC DEVICE EVALUATION AND
SAFETY ANNUAL REPORT, pt. 7, tbl.3 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/

annual/fy2003/ode/part7.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005) [hereinafter ODE REPORT]. An
example often cited by critics of the PMA process is that of an artificial heart that had been
used in Europe for ten years before it was finally approved in the United States. Pulley
Radwan, supra note 3, at 347.
19. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2005) (laying out in detail the exact information that must
be present in the PMA application). See also U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Device Advice,
PMA Application Contents, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/index.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2005) [hereinafter FDA, Device Advice, Application Contents] (explaining
that manufacturers are "encouraged" to provide information about what countries the
device has been distributed in and "encouraged" to provide summaries of reported adverse
effects of the device).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20; FDA, Device Advice,
Application Contents, supra note 19. See also Gregory J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully,
Express Preemption and PremarketApproval Under the Medical Device Amendments, 59
FOOD DRUG L.J. 245, 249-50 (2004) (giving an in-depth explanation of the information
that must be submitted in the application and adding that if supplying a sample of the
device is impracticable, then the manufacturer must provide time for the FDA to examine

it).
21. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.44 (2005) (explaining the approval process once the
completed application is received).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(e)(2000).
23. Michael E. Petrella, License to Maim: Federal Pre-emption and the Medical
Devices Amendments of 1976, 6 HEALTH MATRIx 349, 369 (1996). Allegations have been
made that those at the FDA charged with reviewing medical devices are required to
maintain a ninety-eight percent approval rate on devices. Id.
24. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Device Advice, PMA Application Methods,
available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/app-methods.html#traditional (last
visited Oct. 5, 2005) [hereinafter FDA, Device Advice, PMA Application Methods]. See
also Scandaglia & Tully, supra note 20, at 249 (offering a more detailed overview of the
different applications' processes).
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application at different times. 25 The FDA recommends this approval method
for devices that are just beginning clinical studies because the manufacturer
can then supply the study results as they are acquired.26 In order to begin the
modular process, the manufacturer must develop a "PMA shell," which
outlines the schedule for submitting different modules to the FDA. 27 As
each module is submitted, the FDA begins the review process.28 This
method can actually expedite the approval process because the manufacturer
gets feedback throughout the process, so when 29it files the last modules, the
FDA has already completed most of the review.
Another method of approval, currently available only as a pilot
program, is the streamlined PMA. 30 This method is only offered for devices
or technologies that are already familiar to the FDA. 3' The final method is
the product development protocol (PDP). The PDP allows the manufacturer
and the FDA to agree on the criteria for determining whether a device is safe
and effective. 32 If the FDA accepts the PDP proposed by the manufacturer,
it is the equivalent of an approved PMA application.33
Although there are a number of exceptions to the rule that new Class III
devices must go through the pre-market approval process, there are three
commonly used exceptions. 34 First, a device that was in the market prior to
the passing of the MDA does not have to undergo the pre-market approval
process.35 A second exception is the "substantial equivalence" or the
"section 510(k) process. ' 36 This process allows a manufacturer to get a
device approved quickly if it is "substantially equivalent" to a product that

25. FDA, Device Advice, PMA Application Methods, supra note 24.
26. Id. Generally this method is not recommended if a manufacturer can almost
complete a full PMA application or if the device is going to undergo design changes. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. This method has the potential to save time and money because the FDA and the
manufacturers are communicating early in the process. Id.
33. Id.
34. There are three other exceptions, but they are not commonly used: 1) humanitarian
devices, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(m); 2) custom devices, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(b); and 3) emergency
devices. The emergency devices exception does not arise from language of the statute.
Rather, it arises from the ability of the FDA to use discretion in enforcing its authority:
The [FDA] recognizes that emergencies arise where an unapproved device may
offer the only possible life-saving alternative, but an IDE [Investigation Device
Exemption] for the device does not exist, or the proposed use is not approved under
an existing IDE, or the physician or institution is not approved under the IDE.
Using its enforcement discretion, FDA has not objected if a physician chooses to
use an unapproved device in such an emergency, provided that the physician later
justifies to FDA that an emergency actually existed.
U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Guidance for Institutional Review Boards and Clinical
Investigators, Emergency Use of Unapproved Medical Devices (1998), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/devices.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(l)(A)-(C).
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was in the market prior to 1976.37 Since approval under this standard is
much easier and faster, it appeals more to manufacturers. 38 The final
exception is the investigational device exemption (IDE). 39 The IDE permits
medical devices to be used while compiling the necessary information for a
PMA.40
C. Post Approval Requirements
After a device receives PMA approval, the FDA may impose
obligations on the manufacturer in order to maintain that approval. 4' The
manufacturer must submit FDA post approval reports each year after the
initial date of approval notifying the FDA of modifications such as changes
in design or device usage.42 Manufacturers are required to perform post
approval surveillance of the devices they put onto the market and must have
their surveillance plan approved by the FDA.43
D. GeneralPreemptionPrinciples
The Supremacy Clause states: "The Laws of the United States... shall
37. Nast, supra note 7, at 92.
38. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (finding
that the § 510(k) process lacks the rigor of the PMA). The § 510(k) process has an
average review time of only eighty days while the average for PMA is 12.5 months. CTR.
FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DEVICE
CENTER'S FY 1999 PERFORMANCE (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/

topics/ANSWERS/ANS00998attachments/cdrh.html(last visited Oct. 7, 2005). See also
ODE REPORT, supra note 18, pt. 7, tbl.3 (citing that, in 2002, forty-nine PMA applications
were filed with the FDA as compared to 4320 applications under the substantial
equivalence process.)
39. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (2000).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(1) (2000).
41. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Device Advice, Postapproval Requirements,
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/postapproval.htmlftgeneral (last visited Oct. 7,
2005) [hereinafter FDA, Device Advice, PMA Postapproval]. See also Scandaglia &
Tully, supra note 20, at 252-53 (giving a very detailed explanation of the various
postapproval requirements with which a manufacturer may have to comply). See also
Pulley Radwan, supra note 3, at 349 (explaining that amendments to the MDA in 1990
required postapproval surveillance of all devices first introduced after Jan. 1, 1991, if the
device fit into the Class III designation). Other 1990 amendments increased the FDA's
power to stop distribution of devices, to inform hospitals of potentially dangerous devices,
to subpoena evidence to aid in evaluating PMA applications, and to fine violations of FDA
provisions. id.
42. FDA, Device Advice, PMA Postapproval, supra note 41. The reports must list at
least any changes to the device that could effect its safety or effectiveness due to: 1) new
uses, 2) any labeling changes, 3) changes in manufacturing location or practices,
4) changes in design or performance characteristics, or 5) changes in packaging. The
reports must also include any updated clinical studies even if unpublished. Scandaglia &
Tully, supra note 20, at 252-53.
43. 21 C.F.R. §§ 822.8-822.14. The submitted documents must contain: 1) name and
address of the manufacturer, 2) name of the device (generic and trade name), 3) contact
person for the submission, 4) the PMA numbers of the device, 5) table of contents,
6) description of the device, 7) products codes and all relevant model numbers, 8) a list of
uses for the device, and 9) the actual surveillance plan that will be used. 21 C.F.R. § 822.9.
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be the supreme Law of the Land. 4 4 A plain statement like this would seem
to leave no ambiguity as to the supremacy of federal law. However, the
reservation to the states of powers not granted to the federal government
leaves room for disagreement over exactly what federal laws are supreme.4"
A federal statute may preempt state law either expressly or implicitly.
To determine if a statute expressly preempts state law, all that needs to be
examined is the precise wording of the statute. 4 6

Implied preemption is

determined by looking at the language of the statute and ascertaining the
intent of Congress.4 7
There are two types of implied preemption. 48 The first is field conflict.
Field conflict occurs when federal legislation is intended to dominate a

44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 states that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
When considering the Supremacy Clause there is an assumption that Congress did not
have the intent of displacing state laws. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
See also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2088
(2000) ("[lIt is critically important to note [that] the Supremacy Clause itself does not
authorize Congress to preempt state laws."); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 768 (1994) ("In the American context, the most
common and consequential error is the belief that Congress's power of preemption is
closely and essentially connected to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."). Some
authors propose that Congress' power to preempt state law does not come from the
Supremacy Clause, but rather, from the Commerce Clause. Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress
Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U.L REv. 559, 607
(1997). Others propose that congressional power comes from the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
782(1994)
45. "[T]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Historically, the power to regulate health and safety and the power
to compensate persons injured by defective products has rested with the states under the
police power. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1994).
46. See Trent Kirk, Fraud on the FDA & Buckman-The Evolving Law of Federal
Preemption in Products Liability Litigation, 53 S.C. L. REv. 673, 675 (2002) (offering a
short concise definition of express and implied preemption). See also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (requiring Congress to provide a clear indication
that it intends to preempt state law); Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995) (explaining that if a statute contains an express
preemption clause the court will start by looking at the language of the clause); Cipollone
v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) (stating that when it is not clear if
Congress had the intent to preempt state law the court will rule against preemption).
47. Kirk, supra note 46, at 675. The Supreme Court developed a three part test for
determining preemption: 1) "[did] the Act's express pre-emption provision pre-empt this
lawsuit?"; 2)"[did] ordinary pre-emption principles nonetheless apply?"; and 3) "[did] this
lawsuit actually conflict with the act itself?" Id. at 678 (discussing Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)).
48. Id. at 675.
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particular field.4 9 In general, courts will find field preemption in those areas
where the federal government has exclusive authority, such as immigration
and foreign policy, where Congress intended to eliminate dual federal and
state legislation, or where there is a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 50 The
second type of implied preemption is conflict preemption, which arises when
a state law conflicts with, or is contrary to, a federal law, in which case the
federal law prevails. 5 1
E. The MDA's Preemption Clause
The MDA's preemption clause states that:
Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or political subdivision of a
State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for
human use any requirement-

(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any52 other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this Act.
Even though Congress passed the statute in 1976, courts and
commentators continue to debate over the definition of the word
"requirement" as it is used in the statute.
This dispute, however, did not receive much attention until 1992 when
manufacturers began to widely use the MDA's preemption clause as an
affirmative defense against common law tort claims.53 Then, in 1996, the
United States Supreme Court ruled on the MDA's preemption clause in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.5 4 In that case, a heart patient alleged injury by a
49. 2 DAVID G.
885 (3d ed. 2000).

OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY §28.2, at

50. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 385-90
(2d ed. 2002).
51. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 ("In the absence of an express Congressional
command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law or if
federal law, so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.") (citations and internal quotes
omitted). Some examples of conflict preemption are: McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S.
115 (1913) (holding that the federal labeling requirements preempted the Wisconsin
statute); Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461
(1984) (holding that the Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967 preempted a Michigan
statute that was an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal act's goals). See Richard
C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law By Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court
Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L. J. 913, 922-23 (2003-2004)
(discussing conflict preemption in more detail).

52. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (emphases added).
53. See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504. The plaintiffs in Cipollone brought a wrongful
death claim against cigarette manufacturers. The court held that the failure-to-warn claims
were preempted because the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 contained
certain warnings that had to be placed on cigarette packages and state law could not
require different warnings.

54. Lohr, 518 U.S 470.
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defective pacemaker manufactured by Medtronic. 5 The pacemaker in
question had been approved pursuant to the § 510(k) process.56 The Court,
although divided in parts of the decision, did agree on a few issues. The
Court held: First, the MDA's preemption clause did not expressly preempt
all common law causes of action;57 second, if a common law cause of action
is a mirror image of the federal requirements, then that claim is not barred; 59
and, finally, based on the fact that the pacemaker in the case underwent the
§ 5 10(k) process, the claims were not preempted.5 9
The Supreme Court's decision in Lohr never affirmatively defined
"requirement," which has allowed the debate to carry on. The plurality
found that claims under state common law were not "requirements" as the
word is used in the MDA. 60 However, five other Justices thought that state
claims may be "requirements" in some situations. 6' Another Justice,
although agreeing that state claims could be "requirements," still found that
Lohr's claims were not preempted.6 2
III. ANALYSIS
The first part of this analysis will discuss the arguments offered by
courts in interpreting Lohr, holding that the MDA's preemption clause does
63
not preempt common law claims against manufacturers of medical devices.
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc.64 will be offered as a leading example of the
argument against preemption. 65 The second part of this analysis will discuss
the arguments for preemption using the recent case of Horn v. Thoratec66 as
a primary example of the arguments in support of preemption.
A.

Arguments Against Preemption

A leading case ruling against preemption is Goodlin.67 Like Lohr,6 8
Goodlin involved an allegedly defective pacemaker that Medtronic Inc. had
manufactured. After Goodlin received her FDA approved Medtronic
55. Id.

56. Id. at 480-81.
57. Nast, supra note 7, at 95.
58. Id.
59. Id. It is significant that the Court in Lohr did not deal with a device approved
under the PMA process. The court held that claims against devices that did not undergo
PMA would not be preempted but did not go as far as saying that those devices that did
undergo PMA would be shielded.
60. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487-89.
61. Id. at 512 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
62. Id. at 503-04 (Breyer, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 508.
64. 167 F.3d 1367, 1368 (11 th Cir. 1999).

65. Id.
66. Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 164.
67. Goodlin, 167 F. 3d at 1367. See also Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. 721
N.E.2d. 1149 (I11.1999); Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 656 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997); Mears v. Marshall, 944 P.2d 984 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (holding, in various state
courts, that the PMA does not preempt common law claims).
68. Goodlin, 167 F.3d at 1367.
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pacemaker, the FDA discovered that there was a risk that the pacemaker
could fail due to wiring insulation failure. 69 As a result, Goodlin underwent
open-heart surgery to replace the faulty wiring.70 Goodlin then brought suit
asserting claims of negligent design and strict product liability. 71 The
Goodlin decision represents the minority view. Courts following the
Goodlin reasoning would find that the PMA process does not impose
specific requirements,7 2 preemption would be inconsistent with the purpose
73 and preemption would leave injured parties without judicial
of the MDA,
74

recourse.

1.

The PMA Process Does Not Impose Device-Specific Requirements

As discussed earlier, the PMA process requires a substantial amount of
time to complete. Although that process seems grueling, it is mostly
administrative; as long as the manufacturer supplies the FDA with all
requested information and convinces the FDA the device is reasonably safe,
the product will be approved.75 Once the FDA issues approval for a device,
the manufacturer may start to sell that device. The FDA approval does not
cite any requirements that were used in the approval process. 76
The PMA process, although specific to the particular device being
approved and more stringent than the § 510(k) process, does not involve any
77
particular requirements that must be met in order to gain approval.
Therefore, the MDA's preemption clause is not satisfied. If the PMA
process itself is the federal requirement, then § 360k(a) would essentially
preempt all claims, leaving manufacturers immune from tort actions.7 8 An

69. Id. The wire that could fail was the 4004/M lead, which is the wire that provides
the electrical pulse from the pacemaker to the heart. Id.
70. Id. at 1369.
71. Id. At the district court level, Medtronic motioned for summary judgment based on
preemption and the district court granted its motion. Id.
72. Id. at 1375.
73. Id. at 1378.
74. Id. at 1379 ("There is no explicit private cause of action against manufacturers
contained in the MDA, and no suggestion that the Act created an implied private right of
action .... ) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487).
75. Id. See also Horn, 376 F.3d at 186 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (stating that the proper
way to resolve the issue between the FDA approving a device as safe and a state claim
saying it is unsafe is to view the PMA process as a "'floor' of minimum standards for
Class III devices, but not a 'ceiling."').
76. Goodlin, 167 F.3d at 1375.
77. Id. at 1376 ("[W]hile a PMA review is considerably more rigorous and detailed
than the premarket notification [510k] process at issue in [Lohr v.] Medtronic, it is, in fact,
no more 'specific' a requirement.") (quoting Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 656
N.Y.S.2d 16, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)).
78. In re St. Jude Med., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148, at *33. It should be noted that
one goal of products liability law is to allocate the cost of loss/injury to those who are most
capable of absorbing that cost. See Lasso, supra note 1, at 12-18 (discussing the
objectives of product liability law). As a point of reference, Thoratec Corp., which
manufactured the faulty HeartMate in Horn, had a net profit of $1,294,000 and paid
$133,000 in legal settlements for the first quarter of 2004. Thoratec Corp., Quarterly
Report (1O-Q Filing), at 4-5 (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
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example of a requirement that would invoke § 360k(a) preemption protection
for manufacturers would be if the FDA stated that all pacemakers must be
made with ceramic insulation and if, subsequently, those ceramic insulators
failed.
The Lohr Court interpreted the MDA's preemption clause to apply
preemption only to device-specific requirements.80 The Court looked to the
FDA's interpretive regulations, which state that § 360k(a)(1) only applies
when there is a specific requirement "applicable to a particular device."'" It
must be remembered that all the FDA requires of a manufacturer is to
provide a "reasonable assurance" of the safety and effectiveness of the
device. 82 This reliance on manufacturers' cooperation has led to allegations
of the FDA "pandering to the medical device industry" and that the FDA has
not properly enforced its own provisions when manufacturers have not
complied.83 Simply because the FDA requires manufacturers to submit
specific information and follow specific procedures does not automatically
make the PMA process a specific requirement that would allow
84
manufacturers to invoke preemption to remain immune from lawsuits.
2.

Preemption Would Be Inconsistent With the Purpose Of the MDA

Congress enacted the MDA for the purpose of "providing for the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices intended for public use ....
85 The
legislative history of the MDA discusses the FDA's failed attempts to stop
dangerous devices from entering the marketplace. 86 Neither the MDA itself,

edgar/data/350907/OOOO950134040074401f98986elOvq.htm#105 (last visited Sep. 22,
2005).
79. Weiland, 721 N.E.2d at 1153. See also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 504 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part) (offering hypothetical FDA regulation requiring a two-inch wire for a
certain component of hearing aids would preempt state common law claim that premises
liability on the manufacturer's failure to use a one-inch wire).
80. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 498.
81. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d), quoted in Lohr, 518 U.S. at 498.
82. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1). See also Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort
Law Deference to FDA Regulations of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2139-40
(2000) (noting that the scientific evidence that provides reasonable assurance of device
safety is not as demanding as that required for new drugs). A new drug generally requires
two controlled clinical studies as opposed to medical devices that only require one clinical
study and also which may not require any controls. Id. at 2136. New drugs require a
manufacturer to provide "substantial evidence" of the drugs safety. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)
(2000).
83. Petrella, supra note 23, at 364. A 1992 report of the House of Representatives
found that manufacturers often follow deceptive practices to avoid disclosing adverse
effects of their products and the FDA does not take adequate action against those parties.
Id.
84. See Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965 F.Supp. 49, 54 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that
simply having to comply with certain procedures and regulations does not rise to the level
of a specific requirement).
85. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 539
(1976) (preamble).
86. See S.REP. No. 94-33 at 2-7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 107176. Goodlin, 167 F.3d at 1378 (offering the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device as an
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nor the FDA's interpretive regulations, directly address the question of
liability arising in connection with defective medical devices. 87 It is
important that Congress did not "clearly and manifestly" state that its
intention was to preempt all common law tort claims because Congress will
not usurp the 88traditional police powers of the states without making that
purpose clear.
In Lohr, Justice Stevens wrote convincingly that preemption would be
contrary to the purpose of the MDA. 9 Finding that the MDA preempts all
common law claims would leave the injured consumer, whom the MA was
meant to protect, with no legal relief from a company's negligent design or
manufacturing.90 Justice Stevens went on to add that it would be difficult to
believe that Congress would take away all means of legal recourse from
injured consumers without making that intention incredibly clear. 9 ' Justice
Stevens also reasoned that reading § 360k in favor of preemption would have
the effect of granting immunity to the industry whose dangerous products the
MDA were specifically passed to regulate. 2
Another issue bringing Congress' intent into question was the "savings
clause" it included in the MDA, namely, that complying with orders under
the MDA does not relieve a party from federal or state liability. 93 The
language of the savings clause supports a finding that Congress had not
94
intended to immunize manufacturers of medical devices from civil liability.
In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the Court stated that a savings clause is an
important indication that Congress recognized the "important remedial role
[of state law] in compensating accident victims." 95 The Court further
reasoned that the goal of product uniformity was less important than the

example).
87. Lohr, 518 U.S. at491.
88. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. See also Woods v. Gliatech Inc., 218 F, Supp. 2d 802, 810
(2002) (rejecting the defendant's claim that Congress' intent to have § 360k(a) preempt
common law claims when manufacturer had only received a conditional approval from the
FDA.); Grey, supra note 44, at 610 (stating that the Court should follow the "clear
statement" rule, which requires that before preemption will occur, the intent of Congress
must be perfectly clear and unambiguous).
89. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487. See also supra note 85 and accompanying text (stating the
purpose of the MDA).
90. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487. See also Woods, 218 F.Supp. 2d at 810 (quoting Justice
Stevens's reasoning in Lohr).
91. Lohr,518 U.S. at487.
92. Id.
93. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (1994) ("Compliance with an order issued under this section
shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law.").
94. Goodlin, 167 F.3d at 1378-79 (stating that inclusion of a savings clause expresses
congressional intent not to preempt state common law claims, which would leave injured
consumers with no legal recourse). See Kirk, supra note 46, at 692 (2002) (discussing
principles of savings clauses); See also Roberts S. Adler & Richard A.Mann, Preemption
and Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REv. 895, 929 (1994) ("[The
savings clause] explicitly indicates that a company's compliance with an FDA recall order
will not bar tort claims against it.").
95. 537 U.S. 51 (2002). In Sprietsma, the Court balanced an express preemption
clause with the savings clause within the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971.
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objective of safety. 9 6 Some commentators argue that courts should give the
words used in a statute their ordinary meaning and if a savings clause states,
"compliance with a federal safety standard does not exempt any person from
any liability under common law," the court should rule against preemption.97
B. Arguments for Preemption
Recently, the Third Circuit joined the majority of courts finding
preemption with its decision in Horn v. Thoratec Corp.98 In Horn, the wife
of a man killed when his "HeartMate" 99 separated from his body causing an
air embolus'00 to travel to his brain, filed suit against the manufacturer.'0 '
Five months after receiving the HeartMate, Horn began bleeding where the
HeartMate tube exited his body. An exploratory surgery was then performed
on Horn and the surgeon found that the suture connecting the pump to the
output side had become worn, allowing a disconnection. 10 2 The HeartMate
10 3
underwent the PMA process and the FDA approved it.' 04
The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
MDA's preemption clause expressly preempted Mrs. Horn's claims.'0 5 The
District Court ruled in favor of the manufacturer after applying a twopronged test, which states a claim is preempted if: "1) the FDA has
established specific federal requirements that are applicable to that particular
device, and 2) the state10 claim
is different from, or in addition to, the specific
6
federal requirements."

96. Id. at 69-70. See also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Shedding Light on the Preemption
Doctrine in Product Liability Actions: Defining the Scope of Buckman and Sprietsma,
6 DEL. L. REv. 143, 172 (2003) (discussing in more depth the Court's reasoning in
Sprietsma).
97. Ausness, supra note 51, at 974. See also Dinh, supra note 44, at 2113 ("Both are
words in the same statute and thus each should be given full meaning under ordinary
interpretative principles.").
98. Horn, 376 F.3d 163.
99. The HeartMate pumps blood between the heart's ventricle and the aorta. The inlet
side is attached to the ventricle and it carries blood to the pump. The outlet side takes
blood from the pump to the aorta where it is then dispersed throughout the body. A tube
attached to the pump exits the body and connects to a console that powers the HeartMate
with compressed air, Horn, 376 F.3d at 164.
100. "Air Embolus: an abnormal particle (as an air bubble) circulating in the blood."
MERRIAM WEBSTER ON-LINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
?book=Dictionary&va=embolus&x= 16&y=13 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
101. Ms. Horn's complaint alleged "defective design and manufacture of the HeartMate
and failure to warn of the alleged defects; it was based on Horn's claim that the
HeartMate's output side elbow was defectively designed." Horn, 376 F.3d at 165.
102. Id.
103. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c).
104. Horn, 376 F.3d at 164-65.
105. Id. at 165.21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
106. Horn, 376 F.3d at 165. See also Kemp, 231 F.3d at 224-25 (applying this test and
finding preemption); Goodlin, 167 F.3d at 1382 (applying this test and finding that
plaintiff's claims were not preempted).
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The PMA ProcessEstablishesSpecific FederalRequirements That Are

Applicable to That ParticularDevice

The Horn majority held that "the requirements imposed by the FDA
upon the HeartMate when it was granted PMA approval are precisely 'the
sort of concerns regarding a specific device' which the Supreme Court
intimated would give rise to preemption under § 360k(a)."' 10 7 Another major
reason given for finding preemption is the apparent rigors of the PMA
process.108 The court found specific requirements existed because the
manufacturer had spent so much time and effort working with the FDA to
get the HeartMate approved and had made modifications to the device at the
FDA's request. 0 9 Despite Mrs. Horn's argument that the FDA had
previously argued the opposite conclusion,"10 the majority was also greatly
influenced by the FDA's assertion that PMA approval is a specific
requirement that imposes preemption.]"
107. Horn, 376 F.3d at 169. (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501).
108. See, e.g., Martin, 254 F.3d at 584-85 (finding MDA preemption); Mitchell, 126
F.3d at 911-12 (finding preemption based on PMA requirements; Buckman, 531 U.S. at
348 ("[T]he §510(k) process lacks the PMA review's rigor: The former requires only a
showing of substantial equivalence to a predicate device, while the latter involves a timeconsuming inquiry into the risks and efficacy of each device.").
109. Horn, 376 F.3d at 170. The court notes that there was correspondence between the
manufacturer and the FDA discussing a leak from the screw ring of the HeartMate and that
the FDA approved design changes. Id. It is important for the reader to note that the court
only says that the FDA approved a design change and that the FDA did not tell the
manufacturer what change to make. Id. It is also important to note that a leak from the

screw ring is what led to the death of Mr. Horn. Id. at 165.
110. This author finds it curious that in 1998 the FDA filed an amicus curiaebrief with
the Supreme Court espousing the opposite view. Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Kernats,
520 U.S. 1208 (1997). It is also interesting that in 1997 the FDA proposed a rule to aid in
"clarify[ing] and codify[ing] the agency's longstanding position that available legal
remedies, including State common law tort claims, generally are not preempted under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act" for medical devices. Medical Devices;
Preemption of State Product Liability Claims 62 Fed. Reg. 65384 (Dec. 12, 1997)
(emphasis added). The FDA withdrew this proposal the following year. 63 Fed. Reg.
39789 (July, 24 1998). The fact that the agency in charge of interpreting its own
provisions would take the opposite stance in cases only separated by six years seems odd,
but it may be helpful to remember that in those six years there has been a pro-tort reform
political climate. It has been argued that "[t]hose who are limited by a legal restriction
should not be permitted to determine the nature of the limitation, or to decide its scope,"
rather the scope of the limitation should be determined by an entity other than the agency
to be restricted. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV, L. REv. 405, 446 (1989). Sunstein's argument is even stronger "when an unelected
agency is seeking to diminish the historic police powers of the states." Ausness, supra
note 51, at 975-76.
111. Id. at 171-72, The FDA filed an amicus curiae Letter Brief in which it stated:
The FDA can impose requirements by rule or order, regardless of whether or not
the requirements were initially suggested to the agency by an outside
party .... Although the PMA approval order does not itself expressly reiterate all of
the specific features the device's design ... must have, it specifically approves as a
matter of law those features setforth in the applicationand binds the manufacturer
to produce and market the product in compliance with the specifications as
approvedby the FDA.
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2. The State Claim is Different From, or in Addition to, the Specific
FederalRequirements

The second step courts have taken when dealing with preemption is to
compare the federal and state requirement and decide if the state claim is
different from, or in addition to, the specific federal requirement.112 Courts
that find common law claims are preempted often start with the premise that
it has been clearly established that under § 360k(a), a requirement can
include legal requirements that are the result of court decisions when
common law claims are brought. 13 Operating on this premise, these courts
14
then go on to determine if the particular claim being brought is preempted.
If the common law claim imposes a requirement that is different from, or in
addition to, 5an identified specific federal requirement, then the claim is
preempted."1
One major reason courts offer for finding preemption is that if a state
jury comes to a different result than6 the FDA, manufacturers will be
subjected to many different standards."
In Horn, Mrs. Horn's design defect and failure to warn claims were
preempted because a jury finding a design defect would require the
manufacturer to use a new design in this jurisdiction, but would allow the
manufacturer to continue selling its device, as is, in other jurisdictions.1 7 In
line with this argument is the slippery slope argument that some
Brief for FDA as Amicus Curiae, at 23-24;, Horn, 376 F.3d 163 (No. 02-04597).
112. Horn, 376 F.3d at 165.
113. Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 541-42 (3rd Cir. 1994).
114. Horn, 376 F.3d at 166.
115. Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 911-12; Kemp, 231 F.3d at 230; Martin, 254 F. 3d at 581-83.
At least one author has commented that it "is 'possible' to comply with conflicting state
and federal requirements as long as at least one is enforced by only civil damages" and
that potential tortfeasors do not have to change their behavior if willing to pay damages.
Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-emption
DoctrineSwallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1444 (1998).
116. Brooks, 273 F.3d at 797 ("[I]gnore the need for national uniformity in product
regulation, one of the explicit goals of the MDA.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 853, 45 (1976)).
"[I]f a substantial number of differing requirements applicable to a medical device are
imposed by jurisdictions other than the Federal government, interstate commerce would be
unduly burdened." See also Horn, 376 F.3d at 176, n.20 (stating that The Product
Liability Advisory Council argued, in an amicus curia brief, that "[i]f the PMA process
does not preempt state product liability suits [and general common law claims] imposing
requirements at odds with the approved PMA, then juries in every state will influence
device regulation, in numerous and often conflicting ways"). But see, supra note 4 and
accompanying text (noting that the second aim of the MDA was to create a uniform
regulatory scheme, which would encourage innovation in the field and prevent
overregulation). It appears that the MDA was meant to assure safety of devices before
they are placed on the market and not to offer blanket immunity to devices certified as
reasonably safe by the FDA.
117. Horn, 376 F.3d at 176-77. See also Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 913-14 ("[T]o the extent
that [the Mitchells' mislabeling, misbranding and adulteration] allegations claim that
Collagen has incurred liability under state law despite its conformity to the requirements of
the PMA, the state law claims must be considered preempted."); Martin, 105 F.3d at 1100
("To allow a state cause of action for inadequate warnings would impose different
requirements or requirements in addition to those required by federal regulations.").
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commentators offer. They contend that if common law claims are not
preempted, then development of medical technologies will completely
stop.''s
IV. PROPOSAL

A.

Pre-marketApproval is Not a Specific Requirement
That Triggers Preemption.

The Eleventh Circuit correctly concluded that § 360k is not, in and of
itself, a specific requirement. 119 Although the pre-market approval process
does require a large amount of time, it consists mostly of the manufacturers
supplying the FDA with the results of studies that the manufacturer
conducted. 120 The FDA's reliance on information provided by economically
motivated manufacturers casts doubt on the whole process.1 2 ' The Goodlin
approach is also consistent with the goals of the MDA. The MDA was
passed to "provid[e] for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices
intended for public use.' 2 2 The Goodlin approach is also correct because it
recognizes that the FDA can be wrong in certifying products as safe for
human use. The recent Vioxx debacle is a prime example where the
FDA
23
approved a pharmaceutical and it was later determined to be unsafe.
118. "The law has worked sufficiently well during the last 20 years to allow the most
dramatic era of medical innovation and advancement in history. Overturning the preemption would be enough to bring this dramatic growth in the medical device industry to a
grinding halt." Wayne Barlow, Medical Devices go to Supreme Court, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS, May 1, 1996, at 5. Barlow asserts that "[t]he threat of crushing
litigation and skyrocketing insurance rates would force [medical device companies] to
either pull products from the market or not conduct any business at all." Id. Thoratec, Inc.
is not going to stop operating a business that profited over one million dollars in the first
three months of 2004. Medtronic, Inc. reported net earnings of $535.7 million for the
second quarter of 2004. Medtronic Reports 13-PercentIncrease in Second-QuarterNet
Earnings, BUSINESS WIRE, Nov. 17, 2004, availableat http://www.businesswire.com.
119. Goodlin, 167 F.3d at 1376. "[B]ut because the approval itself neither reveals nor
imposes any ascertainable substantive prerequisite for approval that we could compare to a
purportedly conflicting state requirement, the approval itself does not fit within section
360(k)(a)(1)'s demand for a specific federal requirement." Id. It has been argued that
even if conflicting requirements exist, compliance is not impossible if at least one is only
enforced through civil liability. This is because, in theory, tortfeasors do not have to alter
their behavior as long as they are willing to pay damages to their victims. Raeker-Jordan,
supra note 115, at 1444.
120. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
121. Petrella, supra note 23, at 364. "[T]he accuracy of the FDA's PMA process is
largely, if not exclusively, dependent upon testing and safety data provided solely by the
manufacturer applicant. Limited FDA financial resources and staffing translate into a
PMA regulatory system in which economically motivated profiteers are empowered to
skew the approval decision." Id. at 362-63.
122. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
123. Big Troublefor Merck, THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER, Nov. 10, 2004, available at
http://www.economist.com.
An article in the New England Journal of Medicine on October 21st blasted Merck
for putting 'sales over safety' and its regulator, the [FDA], for sitting on its hands
as evidence of health risks mounted. (The FDA has since asked the Institute of
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Congress Should Rewrite the Express Preemption Clause of the MDA

At least one author proposes modifying the language of the MDA's
preemption provision.' 24 Congress should not modify the preemption clause;
rather, Congress should completely rewrite the clause. Over the course of
the last ten years, there has been extensive 2litigation
over the meaning of the
5
clause and no consensus has been reached. 1
The new preemption clause should explicitly state that it does not
immunize manufacturers from state tort law liability simply because their
devices were subjected to the pre-market approval process. The MDA
contains a savings clause that already states compliance with the FDA does
not immunize a party from civil liability, 126 but Congress needs to state this
principle clearly in the preemption clause. Congress taking the initiative to
change the preemption clause is easier said than done because the
27
manufacturers and their lobbyists would likely fight any change intensely.
C. Congress Should Then Adopt a System of Medical Review Panels
to Evaluate Consumers' Claims of Defective Products
Indiana has adopted a system that "provides for the establishment of
medical review panels to review proposed malpractice complaints against

health care providers."' 128 These review panels consist of one attorney and
two doctors. 129 The attorney serves as a non-voting chairman.130 The statute

states that all medical professionals licensed to practice in the state, except
for health care administrators, are eligible to serve on the panels.131 The
panels are charged with requesting and compiling the information they need

Medicine to study the way it monitors the safety of drugs on the market.)
Id.
A prominent personal injury lawyer has commented that the problem with following a
court decision like Horn is that it bestows a "god-like" status on the FDA, citing the Vioxx
debacle to show the FDA is capable of failing to protect the public health. Robert A.
Clifford, Courts Split on FederalPreemption after FDA Approval, CHICAGO LAWYER,
Nov. 2004, at 21.
124. Sasha B. Rieders, State Law Tort Claims and the FDA: Proposing a ConsumerOriented Prescription in Medical Device Cases, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1159, 1196-97
(2004).
125. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (noting that there is a split in the
circuits to whether claims were preempted or not).
126. See supra note 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing the principles and
functions of a savings clause and the different ways in which courts interpret them). Some
commentators argue that courts should give the words used in a statute their ordinary
meaning and if a savings clause states, "compliance with a federal safety standard does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law," the court should rule against
preemption. Ausness, supra note 5 1, at 974.
127. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that in 1999, a proposed bill in
Congress that would have limited Congress' ability to preempt state and local laws was
dropped because big business opposed the legislation).
128. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-10-1 (Lexis/Nexis 2004).
129. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-10-3(a).
130. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-10-3(b).
131. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-10-5.

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:75

to aid their decisions.' 32 The report that a panel formulates is admissible
(although not conclusive) evidence
in a subsequent trial and the panel
33
members may be called to testify. 1
A system such as the one formed in Indiana would serve the interests of
34
the public without causing the end of medical device development,
Injured consumers would, before filing a lawsuit, bring their claims in front
of one of these panels for the panel to evaluate. If the panel finds that a
consumer has a valid cause of action and would likely recover at trial, the
manufacturer would know that settlement may be in its best interest,
therefore avoiding the potential of so-called "runaway jury verdicts."' 3 5 If
the panel finds the consumer does not have a strong chance of success, the
consumer may still go forward with his case, but the manufacturer has the
benefit of the expert opinion of the review panel. Also, following an
approach similar to Indiana would take the review panels out of the political
arena, unlike the FDA.
For example, in Horn v. Thoratec,136 Mrs. Horn would have first filed a
claim with a medical review panel. That panel would then evaluate her
claims to see if she stated a cause of action. The panel would then apply the
Restatement Second of Torts, § 402A to determine if the manufacturer is
liable. 37 Based on the facts of her case, it seems that a panel would find that
she stated a cause of action and would likely recover at trial. The court in
that case acknowledged that the failure of the ring connecting the device to
Horn's body caused the air embolus that killed him. 13 8 At that point,
Thoratec would be on notice that settlement and product modification would
likely be in its best interest.
A court applying preemption after recognizing that the device in
question killed a patient is inconsistent with the goal of protecting consumers
from unsafe medical devices. FDA approval should be viewed merely as a
manufacturer ensuring that a device is reasonably safe, but should not

132. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-10-21(a-d).
133. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-10-23.

134. Congress passed the MDA with two purposes in mind. First, it was intended to
protect public health by promoting safe and effective medical devices. The second aim of
the MDA was to create a uniform regulatory scheme, which would encourage innovation
in the field and to prevent overregulation. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
"The threat of crushing litigation and skyrocketing insurance rates would force them to
either pull products from the market or not conduct any business at all." Barlow, supra
note 118.
135. "The onslaught in the late 1980s and 1990s of reports about excessive tort liability
and run-away jury verdicts, however accurate or inaccurate, influenced society in ways we
may not fully appreciate." Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption In Favor of
Preemption, 53 S.C.L. REV. 967, 1017 (2002).
136. 376 F.3d at 163.
137. The basic elements a plaintiff needs to show are: (1) the defendant is a "seller"
engaged in the business of selling a product, (2) the defendant's product reached the
plaintiff without substantial change, (3) the defendant's product is "defective" under the
consumer expectations test, the risk-utility test, or the hybrid risk-utility test, and (4) the
defect caused the plaintiff's harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
138. Horn, 376 F.3d at 165.
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completely insulate a manufacturer from all liability. 39 Thoratec, for
example, has no reason to voluntarily modify the HeartMate that killed Horn
because it can keep selling the device as is, and not face civil liability. 40
Some argue that liability will deter manufacturers from developing new
medical devices; but potential liability is a concern for manufacturers of
every product on the market. 141
A system such as Indiana's would allow plaintiffs the chance to present
their case in front of a panel of experts in the medical field, who have no
connection to the FDA, to evaluate the strength of their claim. Those
plaintiffs then have an opportunity to present their case to a jury of their
peers. 142 There is no guarantee of recovery, but at least the consumers can
have their day in court.143 Courts ruling in favor of preemption of all claims
impose an irrebuttable presumption that the device in question was
completely safe simply because the fallible FDA determined it was
after
44
reviewing data that the self-interested manufacturer supplied itself.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments to promote the
production of safe medical devices while not imposing an overly
burdensome regulatory system upon manufacturers. The MDA included an
express preemption clause preempting state requirements that are different
from, or in addition to, federal requirements in order to reach the MDA's
goals. Thirty years after passing the MDA, the debate to determine the
breadth of that clause continues. The majority of courts find that many
common law claims against device manufacturers who put products through
139. The way to reconcile the view that there is no conflict between the FDA allowing
the sale of a device and a state finding that the product is unsafe is to view PMA approval
as a "'floor' of minimum standards for class III devices, but not a 'ceiling'." Id. at 185-86
(Fuentes, J., dissenting).
140. Imposing civil liability would encourage manufacturers to view the FDA standards
as a minimum and would lead them to make their devices as safe as possible. Id. at 18687.
141. "Although the risk of liability may admittedly be a deterrent to TCI's marketing
effort, the Supreme Court has held that the incidental regulation incurred by liability under
generally applicable state law is less intrusive, and therefore less prone to preemption, than
'direct regulation on the operation of federal projects."' Id. at 186 (citing Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1988)).
142. The expert opinion is admissible in court and could aid the jury in evaluating the
facts. One argument pro-preemption parties make is that a jury does not have the expertise
to evaluate complicated claims. Scandaglia & Tully, supra note 20, at 264. The purpose of
expert testimony at trials is to help juries evaluate these claims. FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule
702 also permits "expert opinion even if the matter is within the competence of the jurors
if specialized knowledge will be helpful, as it may be in particular situations." JOHN W.
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMACK ON EvIDENCE STUDENT EDITION § 13, at 54 (4th ed. 1992).
143. It has been argued that preemption of these claims is consistent with the judicial
system because there are times "when a jury finds that the product or person causing the
injury has not violated the relevant standard of care, the injured consumer is turned away
empty-handed." Scandaglia & Tully, supra note 20, at 264. That argument assumes that a
plaintiff at least had a chance to prove a case to a judge or jury.
144. See supraPart III.B. (explaining courts' bases for finding preemption).
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the PMA process are preempted. The minority of courts, led by the Eleventh
Circuit, correctly rule that the MDA does not preempt common law claims
brought against manufacturers.
Congress needs to address this situation. First, Congress should rewrite
the MDA's express preemption clause to clearly state that PMA approval
does not preempt state common law claims brought against companies for
Second,
defective design, manufacturing defects, or failure to warn.
Congress should adopt, or allow the states to implement, a system of medical
review panels that would evaluate claims against manufacturers before those
claims are filed in court. After the panel has evaluated the claims, the parties
will then have an admissible expert opinion to help them evaluate their case
and determine whether dropping the claim, filing a lawsuit, or agreeing to a
settlement is in the best interest of the parties involved. This system will
ensure that the goals of providing consumers with safe medical devices while
not overburdening a useful industry will both be met.

